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in a Second-Best World
Abstract
Expansion of human populations and activities has caused increased conflicts between wildlife and
humans. As a result, the distinction between resource and pest species has become blurry. We propose
an economically-based classification of species based on a multi-use bioeconomic model. The
classification of the steady state population of a species is shown to depend on both species’ density and
economic factors. We extend earlier work on multi-use (resourceBpest) species by applying the
theoretical model to a developing country context where property rights to wildlife are imperfectly
enforced, so that second-best trade measures are often applied by the international community to
promote conservation. Upon calibrating the model using data for the African elephant, we derive three
further results. First, when comparing the optimal stock of a multi-use species to the open access stock,
we find that the ranking in terms of abundance is ambiguous. Second, and consistent with existing
literature on resource management in a second-best world, our case study supports the idea that trade
bans have ambiguous effects on wildlife abundance. Third, due to a bifurcation effect characterizing the
multi-use model’s solution, strategic and temporary subsidizing by the North may enable them to free
ride on conservation efforts of the South henceforth.
Key words: bioeconomics, elephants, management, nuisance, open access, pest, property rights,
renewable resources, trade ban
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Introduction
There is a growing awareness that many species cannot be classified dichotomously as either a resource
that provides positive economic value (as a harvested commodity or via in situ conservation, e.g., fish
or endangered species) or a pest/nuisance that yields negative economic value (causing damage in situ,
e.g., insects and rodents). Instead, many ‘traditional resources’ are now seen as both a source of
economic benefits and damages B a multi-use species (Zivin et al. 2000; Rondeau 2001).1 Resources can
turn into pests and vice versa, and often the in situ conservation of wild stocks yields both benefits and
damages. A multi-dimensional management approach is needed to account for both of these attributes.
The African elephant (Loxodonta africana) is a good example. Elephant management is highly
debated within the international community, with opinions divided about whether to maintain or remove
the existing ban on international trade in ivory. The controversy arises, at least in part, because elephant
populations represent an asset for some and a liability for others. Internationally, both the harvest
(primarily, a demand for ivory) and preservation (existence values) of elephants yields economic values.
At a more local level, elephants generate benefits through sales of meat and hides and also their flagship
role in attracting tourists and generating revenues for the eco-tourismindustry. But elephants also create
considerable damage to crops and habitat, and encounters in rural areas result in some villager deaths
everyyear. About 80% of the African elephant’s range lies outside protected areas, and human-elephant
conflict is increasing as the agricultural interface with elephant range expands (Hoare 1999). This
conflict "has become a serious local political issue in recent years" (Hoare 1999, p.689). It is perhaps
no surprise that in one survey in Cameroon, "41% of villagers polled wanted elephants moved and fenced
in elsewhere. A significant minority wanted them all shot" (WWF 2000).
Several recent studies investigate the optimal management of so-called multi-use species
(Rondeau 2001; Rondeau and Conrad 2002; Huffaker et al. 1992; Zivin et al. 2000). The focus on
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optimal wildlife management by a single planner is obviously appropriate for the case of private
landowners in North America (struggling with migrating beavers or feral pigs) or local governments
trying to deal with an exploding deer population. But the set-up may be less applicable to the context
of developing countries where nuisance species often pose greater burdens upon farmers than in
developed countries, and where property rights to many wildlife species are typically imperfectly
enforced. The adverse effects of open access on wildlife conservation are well-documented for wildlife
that yield only benefits. The results have inspired arguments in favor of institutional shifts from open
access to sole ownership (but see de Meza and Gould 1992), although in practice institutional failure and
excessive poaching typically triggers second-best conservation measures by the international community
(e.g., the CITES trade ban on ivory). Open access situations have yet to be explored for wildlife that
create both resource benefits and nuisance costs.
The present analysis focuses on the developing country context to extend earlier research in
several ways. The paper is divided into two major sections. First, we consider optimal management by
a single planner, expanding on prior work by developing an economic classification for species. We find
that a species’ classification can change over time with changes in species density. Moreover, different
types of classifications relate to different types of equilibria, and also different types of dynamics that
could affect policy choices. The planner’s problem is also used as a point of comparison for the case of
open access, which we develop in the second part of the analysis. The open access model involves two
stakeholder groups with different incentives for harvesting wildlife: hunters, who hunt for commodities,
and landowners, who may also hunt to reduce nuisance damage. Without landowners, we find a lack
of property rights might enhance conservation relative to the social optimum. When landowners are
added to the mix, a lack of property rights biases the results in the other direction and overharvesting
is a more likely outcome. The conflicting incentives facing the groups have implications for the
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development and timing of conservation policies. For instance, we investigate a ban on the trade of
wildlife commodities and find ambiguous impacts on wildlife conservation and welfare, depending on
the institutional context and also the timing of the policy -- that is, the timing of the trade ban may matter
for the final outcome. We also find that strategic and temporary subsidizing by the North, made possible
by a bifurcation, may enable them to free ride on conservation efforts of the South henceforth.
As a motivating example, we analyze management and open access harvesting of the African
elephant. Our study expands on prior analyses of elephant management (e.g., Bulte and van Kooten
1999, Barbier et al. 1990, Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992, Swanson 1994) by investigating
how resource and nuisance values create conflicting incentives among multiple stakeholders, and how
this affects optimal and open access dynamics and associated management options.
Biological and economic foundations
We begin by developing the necessary biological and economic foundations for analyzing the social
planner’s problemand the openaccess scenario associated with a countryhosting medium-large elephant
populations, such as Zambia or Kenya. The in situ stock of elephants, x, grows according to
. (1)0x ' g (x )&h
where g(x) represents dendity-dependent growth of the stock ( ,g (0 )'g ( X )'0 ; gx (0 )'( ; gxx <0
where X is the carrying capacity and ( is the intrinsic growth rate) and h represents harvests.
Two types of economic values are associated with the in situ stock. The first value, denoted
U(x) ( ), represents tourismbenefits fromrecreationalactivities suchas elephant watching.2Ux >0;Uxx#0
The second stock-dependent value is the economic damage created by the stock: Z(x) ( ).Zx >0;Zxx$0
These damages include agricultural and habitat damage as well as human mortalities. Brown (2000, p.
879) refers to elephants as a six ton locusts that each eat over 300 pounds of food per day, and he
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mentions that elephants killed 500 people in Zimbabwe in a recent seven-year period.
Demand for harvests is given by the inverse demand, p(h) ( ). Define as the harvest levelph <0
$h
that satiates demand, i.e., . Without nuisance damages, h> is never optimal; h> may bep ( $h )'0 $h $h
optimal if the benefits of nuisance reduction are large enough. Of course, demand is not likely to be
satiated in the case of legalized trade because we're only dealing with one of many countries. But
demand could be satiated under a trade ban as the demand for elephant products (mainly meats and hides
in this case) would only be defined within the producing country. Harvesting costs are defined by the
standard cost function c(h,x) ( ; ; ).3 Given this specification, social netch >0 cx , chx <0 chh , cxx$0
benefits are defined as SNB=Ip(h)dh - c(h,x) + U(x) - Z(x).4
Socially optimal management under a trade ban
We begin by examining the socially optimal management of African elephants within a single country
by an international agency, assuming perfect (and costless) enforcement of property rights and of the
CITES ban on the international trade of ivory.5 Later, we relax the assumption of enforceable property
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where 8 is the co-state variable. The necessary conditions for an interior solution are equation (1) and
(4)p (h )&ch ' 8
(5)08 ' r8%cx&Ux%Zx&8gx
5
Conditions (4) and (5) are fairly standard. But unlike most bioeconomic applications, 8may be positive
or negative (Zivin et al. 2000; Rondeau 2001): harvesting may represent a rent-generating activity or a
costly activity mainly for damage control. The ambiguous sign of 8 may result in a non-convex
Hamiltonian, in which case we cannot assume sufficiencyawaya priori as in standard renewable resource
models.6 If multiple equilibria arise, the various candidates need to be considered on a one-by-one basis
to determine which one maximizes payoffs, as is consistent with the approach of Tahvonnen and Salo
(1996) and Huffaker and Wilen (1989). The sufficiencyconditions will hold for such solutions, although
this can only be verified numerically. We therefore do not present sufficiency conditions here but instead
refer the reader to standard references for these conditions (e.g., Leonard and Van Long 1992; Seierstad
and Sydsaeter 1987).
Steady states and species classifications








Because of the potential non-convexities described above, multiple equilibrium candidates may satisfy
(6) and (7) (see Rondeau 2001; Skiba 1978; Tahvonen and Salo 1996; Huffaker and Wilen 1989; and
Mäler et al. 2000). Which candidate is optimally pursued may depend critically on initial stock levels.
We analyze a non-convex case numerically below.
The RHS of (7) is the adjusted rate of return from holding elephants in situ. The term gx is the
in situ base rate of return, as a result of x being a reproducible asset (liability). The term M=N/8
accounts for additional costs and benefits from letting the asset (liability) grow. This term reflects
several tradeoffs that give rise to the classifications in Table 1, formalizing some of the concepts raised
by Rondeau (2001).
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[Insert Table 1 about here]
The tradeoffs in Table 1, which are defined at the margin, vary along two dimensions. The first
dimension (row entries) is the sign of the ex situ marginal net benefits. When 8>0, elephants are
harvested as a resource or commodity (class I or class II). Alternatively, elephants are are harvested as
a nuisance or pest when 8<0 (class III or IV). The second dimension (column entries) is the sign of the
in situ marginal net benefits. When N>0, there are conservation incentives at the margin and elephants
are an in situ asset (class I or class III). Alternatively, elephants are an in situ liability (class II or IV)
when N<0, as there are marginal incentives to deplete the stock. Thus, a species could simultaneously
be both a commodity and a liability, or both a nuisance and an asset. For instance, in the
commodity/liability case (class II), harvests create rents while keeping the stock in check so that the
liability does not get worse. However, it is not worthwhile to harvest more of the stock and turn the
liability into an asset: the gains in terms of reduced liability do not outweigh the loss of rents that would
arise from a lower price and greater marginal harvesting costs. A similar story holds for the
nuisance/asset case (class III), where large harvests prevent the asset from becoming a liability.
How do these tradeoffs and resulting species classifications translate into optimal stock levels?
Regardless of classification, a larger value of M implies a larger steady state stock: given r, a larger M
implies a smaller gx, which is consistent with larger equilibrium stocks (recall that gxx<0). For a
particular value of r, class II or III steady state stocks must therefore be smaller than class I or IV steady
state stocks (in particular, when M<0 so that 0< , the steady state stock is less than the stock thatr<gx
maximizes g, or the maximum sustainable yield level (MSYL)). In other words, for commodity
equilibria, liability stocks are smaller than asset stocks. The reverse is true for nuisance equilibria.
Finally, the growth function and discount rate may restrict the equilibrium species class: classes
II and III are not feasible when r>( as M must be positive by equation (7). Class II does not emerge
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because it is less costly in this instance to turn the liability into an asset. The larger is r relative to (, the
more beneficial it is to harvest the stock as a commodity and invest the rents elsewhere. This reduces
x along with damages, and the stock becomes an asset. Class III does not emerge when r > ( because
it becomes more costly to invest in nuisance control; the stock grows and class IV emerges.
Optimal elephant management when trade is banned
We return to the case of elephant management because elephants are an excellent example to illustrate
the key tradeoffs that matter in this context. The steady states are examined numerically by adopting the
functional forms and parameter values used by Bulte and van Kooten (1999). Let U(x) = $ln(x),
Z(x)="x, and c(h,x) = ch/(qx), where c/q = 692,300, $=2.6×106, " = 165, (=0.067 and X=300,000.7
This specification is to a certain extent appropriate for countries with medium-large elephant populations
like Zambia or Kenya, although it is best to consider this to be a numerical example rather than a
rigorous case study. Bulte and van Kooten’s demand function is for international trade in ivory, but this
has been banned since 1989. Instead, meat, hides and ivory may only be traded in regional markets.
Data is unavailable to calibrate demand under the trade ban; however, Barnes (1996) notes that elephant
prices are less than average harvesting costs when harvests exceed a few thousand. Given this
observation, we adopt the following specification: p(h)=a-bh, where a= 1000 and b=0.8.8
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The interior steady states are presented in Table 2. Three optimality candidates arise for each
discount rate: the commodity equilibrium is a saddle with elephants being harvested as a commodity
(class I or II, depending on the discount rate); the unstable equilibrium is either an unstable focus or an
unstable, improper node with elephants being harvested as a nuisance; and the nuisance equilibrium is
a saddle with nuisance harvests. The stability of each equilibrium has been calculated using the
eigenvalues of the linearized dynamic system (see Conrad and Clark 1987). Below, we investigate the
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dynamics of the model in greater detail to determine which candidates are actuallyoptimal. Before doing
this, however, notice a few results from Table 2. First, steady state stocks are much smaller than levels
that would occur in the absence of damages (i.e., when "=0). For example, when r=0.1 and "=0, there
is a unique steady state stock of about 272,000 elephants (compared to 15,382 for the commodity
equilibrium and 254,980 for the nuisance equilibrium in Table 2). Second, note that an increase in r
reduces class I stocks (as in conventional resource models, because these stocks are a biological asset
and r is the opportunity cost of leaving this asset in situ) but increases class IV stocks. Class IV stocks
are larger for larger values of r because these stocks are a biological liability and r is the cost of devoting
resources to divest this liability.
Optimal elephant management: identifying optimal equilibria
With multiple optimality candidates, transition paths indicate which steady states are indeed optimal and
how they can be achieved given an initial stock level. The dynamics of the model are determined jointly
by equation (1) and an expression for dh/dt, which is obtained by differentiating (4) with respect to time.
For ease of notation, we adopt general functional specifications but maintain the features of the
numerical specification defined above (e.g., chh=0, , and ) to derivechx h'cx Zxx'0
(8)0h ' [ r&gx p&ch &Ux%Zx%chx g ( x) ] /ph
The multiple optimality candidates arise because the isocline is not monotonic due to the changing0h'0
sign of 8 (see also Rondeau 2001; Tahvonen and Salo 1996; and Huffaker and Wilen 1989).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The phase plane associated with r=0.1 is presented in Figure 1. The curve 8=0 divides nuisance
and commodity harvests: 8<0 for harvests above the 8=0 curve, and 8>0 for harvests below the 8=0
curve. Thus, the 8=0 curve divides the phase plane into subregions (distinct from isosectors) having
different species classifications. Subregions are labeled according to the species classification in that
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subregion. Although Table 1 is defined for the steadystate, the classifications may be extended for other
combinations of x and h by incorporating the capital gain/loss term into the in situ marginal net08
benefits, or simply by obtaining the signs of and for different combinations.8'p&ch r&gx
The isoclines in Figure 1 intersect three times in accordance with the three optimality candidates
in Table 1.9 Only the two saddles are actually candidates for optimality (Tahvonnen and Salo 1996;
Huffaker and Wilen 1989). The initial stock determines which saddle should be pursued. Using the
Runge-Kutta method (see Conrad and Clark 1987), we find the separatrix leading to the commodity
equilibrium (path A) should be followed whenever =72,831. Path A highlights the result thatx0 <x
L
0
elephants are optimally harvested as a nuisance/liability (class IV) for some time before becoming a
commodity/asset (class I). Thus, it may be necessary to temporarily subsidize harvests before switching
to quotas or taxes, depending on the incentives facing private decision-makers.
The separatrix leading to the nuisance equilibrium (path B) should be followed whenever
=72,838 (which is the unstable equilibrium). Although the nuisance equilibrium yields negativex0 >x
U
0
net benefits, path B is socially preferred in this case because the costs of harvesting the stock down to
the commodity equilibrium are too great. Finally, when , path A and path B are bothx L0 # x0# x
U
0
options. Within this range, there exists a value x* such that path A should be chosen when andx0 <x
(
path B should be chosen when (Tahvonen and Salo 1996; Huffaker and Wilen 1989).x0 >x
(
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The phase plane for r=0.05<( is presented in Figure 2, which is labeled in the same manner as
Figure 1. Now, the isocline has a vertical asymptote at the value of x that solves (the0h ' 0 r'gx
dotted line at x=38,060). Below the curve 8=0, the asymptote separates species classes I and II. Above
the curve 8=0, the asymptote separates classes III and IV. Unlike conventional bioeconomic models,
changing the discount rate thus affects the qualitative features of the phase plane for a multi-use species,
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including the optimal approach dynamics as we describe next.
As in Figure 1, the isoclines intersect to create three interior steady states, or candidates for
optimality. The commodity and nuisance saddles could be approached along path A and path B,
respectively. But in contrast to Figure 1, either path A or path B could be followed for initial stock
values in excess of =144,346 elephants. Tahvonen and Salo (1996) and Huffaker and Wilen (1989)x L0
show that the monotonic path A is globally optimal in such instances. The difference between these
results and those of Figure 1 are due to the differences in discount rates used. The smaller the discount
rate, the larger the present value of future damages. Hence, society is better off by harvesting more
nuisance elephants today to reduce future costs. For initial stock levels below the commodity steady
state level, elephants are optimally harvested as a class II species. For all other initial stock levels,
elephants may optimally be harvested as either a class II, III, or IV species.
Optimal elephant management when the trade ban is lifted
To conclude our discussion of optimal management, consider the combined effects of species class and
the trade ban on elephant conservation. This is accomplished by comparing the results derived in the
previous section with optimalmanagement under conditions of legalized trade. Applying the legal-trade
demand function used by Bulte and van Kooten (1999), p=6397 - 0.04h, optimal steady states under a
legalized trade scenario are a unique saddle with elephants harvested as a commodity (22,044 elephants
when r=0.05 [class II]; 6,765 elephants when r=0.1 [Class I]).10 Consistent with Bulte and van Kooten
(1999), the trade ban increases commodity equilibrium stocks under larger discount rates (e.g.,
r>(=0.067, such that elephants are a class I species under legalized trade) and decreases commodity
equilibrium stocks under lower discount rates (r<(). Our results provide further insights into why the
latter result occurs. Elephants are harvested as a class II species under legalized trade with r<(. At the
margin, there is an incentive to deplete the stock (because the in situ benefits are negative) when the
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price is reduced (as occurs under the trade ban). The stock is therefore culled to a lower level of
abundance after the trade ban is implemented. Thus, a conservation policy such as a trade ban may
optimallyhave the opposite effect than what is intended, depending on the species classification. Indeed,
a trade ban reduces the optimal commodity equilibrium stock by almost 27% when r=0.05, from 22,044
elephants to 16,156 elephants.
But what was not previously recognized is that the effect (on wildlife stocks and welfare) of
implementing a trade ban may depend on when the ban is implemented. Timing matters for sufficiently
high discount rates (r>() because both the commodity and nuisance equilibria under a trade ban are
locally optimal, depending on the initial stock level. Timing does not matter when discount rates are
sufficiently low because a global optimum emerges in such cases. If discount rates are sufficiently high,
then conservationists may prefer that a trade ban is introduced early enough that regional governments
may prefer to pursue the nuisance (large-stock) equilibrium. Note this outcome is consistent with
negative social welfare in range states. Indeed, Anderson and Blackhurst (1992, p.42) state
"Conservationists have been prepared to insist on a ban on raw ivory trade in large part because they
have not been required to compensate the losers", the African range states. In other words, the
(wealthy) developed countries free ride on the conservation efforts of the (poor) developing countries.
Open access exploitation
Property rights to elephants are hard to enforce as these animals range over extensive areas, moving
between public and private lands and even crossing borders. How do the results described above
compare to outcomes arising from free entry in harvesting the species? In conventional open access
models, entry (exit) in the harvesting industry occurs as long as profits are positive (negative), so that
equilibrium rents are dissipated. A standard assumption in these models is that competition and free
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entry remove incentives for individuals to consider how their harvesting decisions affect future stocks
(Gordon 1954). The conventional result is over-depletion of resource stocks. The logical corollary of
this result is that an institutional shift from open access to sole ownership will enhance the scope for
conservation. In this section we explore whether this is true or not for the case of a species that can be
a resource or a nuisance. To this end, we compare harvesting equilibria of the government to those
obtained under open access.
In the present case, some individuals have additional incentives to harvest: in addition to reaping
the benefits (if any) of selling harvests in commodity markets they also may benefit from reduced
nuisance B both now and in the future. For example, peasants may shoot elephants because they want
to sell the ivory, but also because they want to prevent an elephant from entering their fields and
destroying their crops. To the extent that damages are exclusive to these landowners, they will have
incentives to consider how their harvesting decisions affect future stocks, and hence future damages.
Landowners are the claimants of future damages and this claim will not be competed away (unlike with
hunters, where competition reduces their claim on future harvesting benefits).
Without loss, consider two types of individuals.11 First are hunters, indexed by j, who value
harvests as a commodity and are not damaged by elephants. Elephants are not confined, so hunters may
harvest on public lands (and possibly on private lands) and thus can enter and exit freely.12 The second
type of individuals are landowners, indexed by i, who are damaged by elephant stocks and may therefore
value harvests both as a commodity and as a method of pest reduction. Landowners also face free
entry/exit into harvesting, but they cannot freely reduce the damage burden placed upon them.
As described above, only landowners have incentives to consider the future. Thus, the model
is to some extent a hybrid of conventional open access models (Gordon 1954) and rational expectations
models (Berck and Perloff 1984). Consider the dynamic problemfaced by individual landowners, noting
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that any rents that arise will instantaneously dissipate due to entry of hunters (i.e., ). Thisp&c / ( qx ) #0
could emerge as an equilibrium, in which case hunters and landowners would be indifferent about
harvesting at current levels as neither would have an incentive to harvest any more or less. For
simplicity, we model an open-loop Nash equilibrium in which each landowner chooses harvests to
maximize his/her net benefits, taking others’ harvest decisions as given. Assume that all hunters and
landowners face the same harvest cost functions, (where is the ith individual’sci (hi ,x ) ' chi / ( qx ) hi
harvest), and harvest price B as landowners could sell meat and hides from culled animals. Damages are
spread evenly over the N landowners, i.e., . Finally, assume that landownersZi (x )'Z ( x) /N'"x /N
reap a portion of tourism values, , where .<1 since some tourism takes place onUi( x) ' .$ ln(x ) /N
public lands.
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œi (11)0µ i ' rµ i&chi / (qx
2 )&.$ / (xN)%" /N&µ i gx&Di c / ( qx
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œi (12)p&c / ( qx ) # 0 ; Di [p&c / ( qx ) ] ' 0
where p=p(h), is the co-state variable from landowner i’s (as opposed to the planner’s) perspective,µ i
and is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the rent dissipation constraint. Consider the singularDi
solution in which condition (10) holds as an equality. When the zero profit condition is binding ( …0),Di
then conditions (12) and (10) imply . When the constraint is non-binding (i.e., =0), then <0µ i'0 Di µ i
and condition (11) differs from its socially optimal counterpart (condition (5)) as individual landowners
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may not care about damages to neighbors and tourism benefits are not fully accounted for.13
Steady States
Two types of steady state equilibria may arise depending on the sign of . If =0, then elephants areµ i µ i
a commodity as hunters have entered freely until profits are dissipated. Thus, the first type of
equilibrium, which we denote the zero profit equilibrium, involving hunters and possibly landowners, and
is characterized by condition (6) and the zero profit condition . These are the standardp ' c / (qx)
equilibrium conditions in conventional open access models (Berck and Perloff 1984). Note that, in
contrast to most open access models, there are multiple steady state candidates associated with the zero
profit condition. This is not due to nuisance damages, but rather the endogenous price and stock-
dependent harvest costs as the zero profit curve p(h)-c/(qx)=0 intersects the isocline in three0x ' 0
places.
The second type of equilibrium, denoted a nuisance equilibrium, occurs when <0 and =0µ i Di
(i.e., nuisance harvesting). In this case, profits from sales are negative: all hunters have exited and only
landowners harvest elephants, doing so as pest control. From condition (10) and given identical
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r&gx
This condition reduces to the zero profit condition as N64: damages are spread out over too many
individuals, and hence no single landowner will choose to incur the costs of harvesting elephants as a
nuisance in order to reduce damages that are largely incurred by others B hunting would be a pure public
good in this case. However, for finite N, some harvesting will be done by landowners as a means of pest
control.
Given this discussion, the first open access result is that multiple steady states are possible.
15
Unlike the case of optimal management, however, multiple steady states may arise for two distinct
reasons. Separate conditions define the zero profit and nuisance equilibria: (a) condition (6) and the zero
profit condition if the solution involves hunters and landowners hunting elephants as a commodity, and
(b) conditions (6) and (13) if the solution involves just landowners hunting to avoid damage. Equilibria
(a) and (b) may each have one or more solutions. But the particular solution(s) that are ultimately
pursued depend on the dynamics of the system, to which we now turn.
Open access elephant harvesting: dynamics
Applying the numerical model from above, open access equilibrium candidates are presented in Table
3 for the case of .=0.3 and r = 0.1, and for two values of N: N=1 and N=100. The phase planes can be
analyzed to determine which candidates will be pursued. The phase plane for N=1 is illustrated in Figure
3. Figure 3 looks similar to Figure 1, although an important difference is that the 8=0 curve, labeled as
B=0 in Figure 3, now represents the zero profit locus along which hunters would harvest elephants (at
least, in the absence of competition by landowners).14 TheB=0 curve intersects the curve in three0x ' 0
places, indicating three zero profit equilibria B two of which are stable and one which is unstable (in the
absence of landowner actions). One stable equilibrium (equilibrium 1) occurs at a lower stock level than
any of the socially optimal stocks listed in Table 2, as might be expected under open access. The other
stable equilibrium (equilibrium 3) occurs at a larger stock level than any of the socially optimal stocks
in Table 2. This clearly contrasts with models not having a nuisance component: hunters harvest too few
animals because they are not responsible for spillover damages caused by migrating wildlife and
disregard the benefits of culling for local landowners. Thus, a lack of property rights may enhance
conservation, at least in the absence of any landowner actions.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here]
But where the stock ultimately stabilizes does depend on the actions of landowners. The 0h ' 0
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isocline in Figure 3 looks similar to its counterpart in Figure 1, except that it only intersects the 0x ' 0
isocline twice. A third intersection would have occurred in the absence of the zero profit constraint, but
with that constraint in place the isocline "ends" (i.e., is cut off) where it meets the B=0 curve0h ' 0
(because outcomes below this curve would generate positive profits which, by assumption, are
instantaneously dissipated by hunters’ entry). The combination of hunters and landowners therefore
alters the dynamics as previously described for the social optimum. For initial stock levels in excess of
82,700 elephants (equilibrium 5), the landowner harvests elephants as a nuisance (so that hunters do not
enter) along a saddle path that leads to the nuisance equilibrium (equilibrium 5). Note the open access
nuisance equilibrium stock is smaller than that of the social optimum (because the landowner does not
reap all tourism benefits) and also the stock that hunters would have pursued in the absence of
landowners (because, unlike hunters, the landowner does take into account nuisance damages). For
initial stocks slightly below 82,700 elephants, the landowner harvests elephants as a nuisance (again,
crowding out hunters) along a saddle path until the zero profit threshold is reached. At this point,
hunters enter and diminish the stock to the zero profit equilibrium 1, which is at a lower stock level than
the landowner would have pursued (this other stock is not reported in Table 3 since it is not a solution
given the zero profit constraint). Note that the approximate threshold of 82,700 elephants (determining
whether the system ends up in the small-stock zero profit equilibria or in the abundant-stock nuisance
equilibria) is greater than that in the social optimum. Relative to the social optimum, fewer initial stock
levels will lead to a nuisance (large-stock) equilibrium and more will lead to the commodity equilibrium
under open access. Hence, while there are incentives to conserve when landowners do not hunt, there
are incentives to over harvest when landowners do hunt.
To consider some of the conflicting interests that may arise between landowners/hunters, local
governments, and the international community, suppose the system is headed for the (low-stock) zero
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profit equilibrium 1. The local government might have an incentive in this case to tax harvests or
subsidize conservation efforts to increase the stock. But depending on the current stock level, the
government might not want to pursue the (high-stock) nuisance equilibria, instead determining the (low-
stock) commodity equilibria from Table 2 is socially optimal. The international community, however,
might prefer a larger stock level because it gets the transboundarybenefits associated with thicker stocks
but none of the damages. In this case, the multiple equilibria in the open access case give rise to an
interesting policy solution for international governments B one that may allow them to free ride on the
conservation efforts of others.
The international community (possibly other nations but more likelyan NGO) could temporarily
subsidize landowners (not hunters) to increase stock levels through a subsidy of the form sx, where s is
the per unit subsidy rate. Essentially, the subsidy would increase the range of initial stock values for
which landowners would be willing to allow the stock to grow. In terms of figure 3, the subsidy would
flatten the northwest hump of the dh/dt=0 isocline so that it no longer intersects the dx/dt=0 isocline at
the commodity and unstable equilibria -- the subsidy creates a bifurcation. As a result, landowners
always have incentives to allow the stock to grow (although hunters become a limiting factor in this
case).15 Once the stock is increased past the approximate threshold of 82,700 elephants, the subsidy
could be removed and landowners and hunters would pursue the nuisance equilibria on their own. Local
governments would also find it beneficial to encourage increased conservation at this point. Hence,
NGOs and/or others can take advantage of a bifurcation that allows them to pursue large stocks while
only incurring a fraction of the costs.16 Of course, this strategy only works when for ther > (
landowner. Otherwise, the phase plane is similar to figure 2 and a (low stock) global optimum emerges.
Hence, for small private discount rates, a permanent subsidy would be needed to encourage
conservation.
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Now suppose N>1. Table 3 present results for the case of N = 100, although we find that all
cases for which N>1 are qualitatively similar. The phase plane (not presented) is analogous to Figure
2, although as above the dynamics are now altered due to the zero profit curve. Landowners in this case
do not account for the full cost savings and tourism benefits that arise from a larger stock. As a result,
they no longer pursue the nuisance equilibrium (equilibrium 7). Instead, they pursue a commodity
equilibrium (i.e., such as the one that arises in Figure 2 in the absence of the zero profit constraint), but
they never reach it because hunters emerge first and drive the stock down further to the zero profit
equilibrium 1.
Note that the policy solution of a temporary stock subsidy, as described above for the case of
N=1, does not work when N>1: society is doomed to a low stock unless a government is willing to
provide a permanent subsidy. Thus, provided that private discount rates are sufficiently large, it is to
an NGO’s advantage to encourage cooperation among landowners. If landowners can be encouraged
to operate as a single entity (so essentially N=1), then NGOs can take advantage of a bifurcation and
offer short term payments. If either of these conditions is violated (i.e., there are multiple non-
cooperating landowners or cooperating landowners who apply a low discount rate), then permanent
subsidies are needed to promote conservation in equilibrium.
The impact of the ivory trade ban under open access
Earlier we explored the impact of a trade ban on conservation when elephants were being managed
optimally. What is the impact when there is imperfect enforcement so that open access emerges? Open
access under legalized trade can be shown to result in a single equilibrium at a very low stock level (108
elephants). Both stable equilibrium stock levels under the trade ban are larger, indicating that the trade
ban generally promotes conservation under an open access regime. However, the particular equilibrium
that is approached after the trade ban is implemented depends on the stock value at the time of
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implementation. Thus, as above, the timing of the trade ban matters for both elephant stocks and welfare
levels.
Discussion and concluding remarks
As human populations and activities continue to expand and (direct and indirect) interaction with wildlife
is increased, more and more species are being discovered to exhibit both resource and nuisance
attributes. In this paper a multi-use bioeconomic model was used to develop an economically-based
classification of species. The classification depends on both species’ density and economic factors, and
it can change over time as these features change. Multiple equilibria may emerge in conjunction with
the various classifications, and it may be possible to approach any one of these depending on the initial
state of the system, the management regime adopted, and the timing of management decisions.
To gain additional insight we developed a numerical example of elephant management. The
results shed some light on the ongoing and heated international discussions (e.g., CITES) on the best
strategy to deal with this large mammal. An important finding is that the classification of elephants is
determined by their (local) level of abundance (which varies greatly over Africa; see Said et al. 1995).
Different steady state classifications are possible, and different types may be distinguished along the
transition dynamics towards steady states. It is therefore easy to understand why international
discussions on the ivory trade ban have proven to be difficult, as have discussions focusing on many
other species whose management is debated in the international arena (whales, tigers, bears, etc.). While
talking about one biological species, delegates from different countries are actually discussing the fate
of different "types" of animals who maybe hunted for different reasons by many different types of people
(e.g., poachers, landowners who suffer nuisance damages), depending on the property rights regimes
in place. Thus, it would be difficult to agree on a single management tool (such as the trade ban) since
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a single tool is insufficient for managing a plethora of "types" of animals. Rather, conservation
instruments should be evaluated at the country or regional level and they should be regularly updated
as animal densities change.
The potential for multiple equilibria highlights the importance of history in conservation,
particularly the timing of conservation policies, as early efforts will to a large degree determine in which
equilibrium the system comes to rest. Significant conservation efforts by the international community
in early periods, for example, might put range states on a trajectory towards a high-abundance stable
steady state. An interesting policy implication is that the international community may only have to offer
short-term incentives for conservation, after which it may become optimal for local managers to pursue
conservation on their own. The temporary incentives ensure that the system proceeds on a trajectory
towards an abundant wildlife stock until a time at which the system is no longer in danger of flipping to
a low abundance steady state. In contrast, low or zero conservation efforts early on could trigger a
trajectory towards a low-abundance steady state. Once on a low-abundance trajectory it may become
too expensive to switch to an alternative trajectory that encourages conservation.
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Table 1. A classification of marginal animal species (for interior solutions).
ex situ marginal net benefits in situ marginal net benefits
&cx%Ux & Zx ' N > 0 &cx%Ux& Zx 'N < 0
I. commodity/asseta II. commodity/liabilitybp & ch ' 8 $ 0
III. nuisance/assetb IV. nuisance/liabilityap & ch ' 8 < 0
Notes: aRequires . bRequires .r>gx r<gx
Table 2. Steady state optimality candidates under a trade ban.
Discount
Rate
Steady State Outcomes Commodity Equilibrium Unstable Equilibrium Nuisance Equilibrium
r = 0.05 Stock 16,156 147,037 234,206
Harvest 1,024 5,023 3,441
Social net benefits
(annual $ in millions)
23.09 1.58 -7.8
Species class II IV IV
Equilibrium Type Saddle Unstable focus Saddle
r = 0.1 Stock 15,382 72,838 254,980
Harvest 978 3,695 2,564
Social net benefits
(annual $ in millions)
23.08 15.29 -9.78
Species class I IV IV
Equilibrium Type Saddle Unstable focus Saddle
r = 0.15 Stock 14,311 43,815 262,163
Harvest 913 2,507 2,215
Social net benefits
(annual $ in millions)
23.05 20.51 -10.57
Species class I IV IV
Equilibrium Type Saddle Unstable, improper
node
Saddle
Table 3. Open access optimality and zero profit candidates under a trade ban.
Steady State
Equilibrium Candidates





(annual $ in millions)
Hunter/Landowner
Equilibria (N=1)a
1. Zero profit* Stable 7,200 48 16.99
2. Zero profit Unstable 19,200 1,205 23.06
3. Zero profit Stable 280,075 1,246 -12.98
4. Nuisance Unstable 82,700 4,013 13.33





3 as described above
6. Nuisance Unstable 19,874 1,243 23.04
7. Nuisance Saddle 279,844 1,260 -12.94
Note: a The three zero profit equilibria correspond to the three equilibria that would arise with hunters but no
landowners. The * indicates which equilibria may actually be pursued. For the case of N=100, only the zero
profit equilibrium 1 will be pursued.
1. At least four factors may contribute to the changing perspectives for many species. (1) As
human development exploits and alters ecosystems, predator-prey relations having little
economic impact in pristine ecosystems are now seen as a source of economic damage. For
instance, whales are valued both as a commodity and as a conservable resource (Horan and
Shortle 1999), but they are also a source of damage to fishermen who must compete with them
for commercially valuable fish (Flaaten and Stollery 1996) -- a problem that has become more
pervasive in recent years due to conservation efforts that have increased whale populations. (2)
As human encroachment diminishes wildlife habitats, economic damages caused by wildlife may
increase. For example, habitat for deer and elephants has been significantly altered over the past
century. With diminished natural food sources and with traditional migration routes blocked by
development, these animals increasingly invade agricultural lands in search of food and water,
creating damages as they eat and trample crops and forage. Deer and moose are also
increasingly responsible for auto accidents in North America and Northern Europe as road and
highway expansions have encroached upon and divided their habitat. (3) Increases in world
trade have been accompanied by increases in the artificial introduction of species into non-native
environments (Carlton 2001). While a species may be of value in its native habitat, it is often
viewed as a pest in non-native habitats. Without natural predators to curtail population growth,
non-native or exotic species can out-compete native species for food and habitat. Exotics are
increasingly considered a major factor in biodiversity loss (Holmes 1998), and can also damage
economic activities more directly. (4) Related to the second and third factors, there are
increasing efforts to re-introduce species that were previously locally extinct (Rondeau 2001),
such as wolves, grizzlies, and beavers. Obvious conflicts may arise between humans and these
sorts of animals, particularly in locations that have adapted to their absence. For instance,
farmers who increased land areas devoted to crops and livestock after a local extinction
occurred may be more vulnerable than ever to species re-introductions.
2. The function U(x) could also include non-use existence benefits (see e.g., Freeman 1993), and
the effect of U(x) is the same as if U was an existence value. We do not model existence values
in the numerical example to follow because there is little data available on these values and
because these values would be largely external to countries such as Zambia or Kenya. They are
presumably much larger at the international level, but even so marginal existence values may be
small when the stock is in no danger of extinction.
3. In addition to these regular harvesting costs, it may be costly to dispose of harvested nuisance
animals for which there is no demand (i.e., ), or there may be social disutility (cost) fromh $ $h
not disposing of them. For instance, suppose 10,000 nuisance elephants are culled. Disposal
costs are likely to be significant, as is the disutility associated with 10,000 rotting carcases.
Generally, three disposal options exist: (i) no disposal (natural decomposition), (ii) physical
disposal (e.g., cremation), and (iii) paying those having a negative marginal utility of
consumption (such that p(h)<0) to consume the harvested animals. Disposal costs are the least
cost combination of these options, and for simplicity we assume the third option is the least cost
approach.
4. We do not consider issues associated with ivory storage, although this is not an issue assuming
the trade ban remains in effect. See Kremer and Morcom (2000) and Bulte et al. (in press) for
discussions of storage issues in the case of legalized ivory trade.
Endnotes
5. In the present model it is equivalent to think of the social planner as a national wildlife agency
since demand is defined at the country level under a trade ban and since we are not modeling
existence values, which would largely be external to African range states. If we were
considering existence values, then the international and domestic social planners would choose
different resource allocations unless there was some mechanism in place for local governments
to capture non-use existence values. Also note that the planner takes the trade ban to be
exogenous, which is probably the case when considering only a single country. According to the
African Elephant Database (Said et al. 1995), some 25 African countries have at least 1000
elephants and therefore across-the-board CITES trade bans are likely more affected by
developments in all countries than by management decisions in a single country. But more
generally the existence of a trade ban is not independent of either international non-use values or
the degree to which access is regulated among all nations that host elephant populations. We
are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
6. The Hamiltonian can be non-convex for other reasons besides the shadow value. For instance,
Tahvonen and Salo (1996) analyze the case of a non-convex damage function. Z(x) could also
be non-convex in reality, with marginal damages at first increasing and then decreasing as some
maximum level of damages are approached. However, elephants are known for killing people in
addition to crops (Brown 2000), and so the assumption is probably reasonable for aZxx $ 0
large range of stock levels.
7. The functional forms are taken from Bulte and van Kooten (1999), although the application of
the present model is quite different. They focused on management and anti-poaching
enforcement issues by modeling the interaction between governments and poachers.
8. The qualitative results are unaffected under a large range of reasonable values for a and b.
9. Because of the uncertainty associated with the demand curve for the trade ban case, we explored
several other demand curves. The qualitative results were the same for all cases as long as b is
not too small. When b is sufficiently small, the downward sloping portion of the isocline0h'0
shifts up and we get a single equilibrium. But even in that case, nuisance harvesting is optimal.
With smaller discount rates, we also find asymptotic phase planes (as described below) in the
single equilibrium trade ban case.
10. Market demand under a trade ban is limited to domestic demand for elephant products. Under
legalized trade, market demand is given by the international demand for elephants, which
includes both domestic and non-domestic willingness to pay for elephant products. Suppose
domestic demand is given by and that non-domestic demand isQD ' aD&bD P
, so that the international inverse demand isQND ' aND&bND P
. It is easy to verify that the international inverseP ' (aD%aND) / (bD%bND)&1/ (bD%bND) Q
demand curve should be less steeply sloped than the domestic curve. Moreover, the
international choke price should be greater than the domestic choke price as long as the
domestic choke price is less than the choke price in non-domestic markets.
11. Our model does not do full justice to the complex case of multiple use in Africa. As indicated by
a referee, there are really three types of people who may want to shoot elephants: 1) hunters
who value elephants as a commodity, and enter until profits have dissipated, 2) private
landowners who care about controlling the nuisance costs of elephants (in addition to any
sellable commodities that are produced in the process of killing elephants), and 3) trophy
hunters, who are typically willing to pay formidable amounts for the right to kill an elephant.
We only consider poachers and landowners and ignore trophy hunting altogether. The reason is
twofold. First, in terms of elephant mortality, trophy hunting is relatively unimportant. Second,
to accurately model trophy hunting, one really needs a sex and age structured model, which
would greatly complicate the model.
12. In Zivin, Hueth and Zilberman’s (2000) feral pig model, the pigs are assumed to somehow be
restricted to private lands so that landowners can charge hunters to shoot the pigs. In our
model, landowners could charge fees for hunting on their land. However, we assume that public
lands suitable for hunting are not scarce and so landowners have no motivation to charge for
hunting on their lands (as there is no demand for this).
13. The tourism industry is not fully involved with the solution (since .<1). However, Coase (1960)
would argue that this industry might bargain with landowners and/or hunters to conserve
elephants, as long as the transactions costs of these negotiations are not too great.
14. Since landowners take p as given, landowner i’s problem is linear in the control variable .hi
Accordingly, it is optimal for landowners to set harvest rates at their maximum or minimum
values whenever condition (10) is not satisfied as an equality, so that the singular solution is
approached along the most rapid approach path. In most linear control bioeconomic models
with p fixed, the singular solution results in a specific value of x. But p is endogenous at an
aggregate level in the present model. The result is that the singular solution is a path as opposed
to a point. Aggregate harvests, h, therefore vary over time and the isocline is well-0h ' 0
defined along the singular path. See Conrad and Clark (1987, pp.28-30) for a brief discussion of
singular paths.
15. Note that a stock-based subsidy paid to hunters would be ineffective as entry and hence harvests
would only be increased by the subsidy.
16. The idea of a "temporary subsidy" only works when African range states are naïve (unsuspecting
to be subjected to strategic manipulation) B otherwise they will note that the subsidy scheme is
dynamically inconsistent, and will be aborted by the self-interested international community after
the threshold has been crossed and the system has entered the region where trajectories lead to
the high-stock equilibrium (see Karp and Newberry (1993) for more on the issue of dynamic
inconsistency).
